

30 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Current Intelligence  
FROM : Latin America Division  
SUBJECT : Comments From OCI Point of View on Cuban  
Reporting [REDACTED]  
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1. Reports [REDACTED]  
from the CIA station have been among our most important sources on the Soviet military situation in Cuba. We have frequently been bedeviled, however, by the failure of some of the reports to provide sufficiently detailed information that would permit us to check out the report with NPIC and other sources. We recognize, of course, that 99 times out of a hundred--and maybe more than that--that lack of precision in the reports is simply because the source is unable to be more precise. However, in some instances he could perhaps be guided to be more precise. When a source, for instance, refers to a Soviet installation "ten kilometers from Jovellanos" it would be useful for us to know in what direction from Jovellanos the place is. The report would be more helpful if it related the location to one or more of the various roads that go out of Jovellanos.

2. One subject of continuing interest on which reporting has been infrequent in recent months is the process of organizing the political party machine in Cuba. According to Cuban officials, the ORI sometime probably early this year is to be transformed into a Soviet-style Communist party called the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. Cuban newspapers and radio broadcasts have for months been referring to meetings at labor centers throughout the country at which "exemplary" workers are "elected" to party cells. According to these reports, the new party is being built from the base up. It would be useful for us to know just what does transpire at these meetings, how the party cells are actually formed, how the process is directed from above, and any steps being made to unite the cells into larger units. Answers to these and other questions might

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help us get a clearer idea of the real nature of the developing party structure in Cuba. Any peculiarities or deviations from the Soviet standard that may become apparent might, in turn, help us answer questions as to whether the Cuban brand of Communism is somehow unique, whether it is like the Chinese, or whether it is a faithful copy of the Soviet system. Whether or not the Communist experiment in Cuba ever gets much beyond where it is now, it will be of continuing interest to study the ways and means by which it is imposed in a Latin American environment.

II. PROBLEMS WHICH THE DIRECTOR IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN

1. Any indications of the withdrawal from Cuba of Soviet military personnel and/or equipment.

2. All information on the possible training of Cubans in the operations of sophisticated Soviet military equipment, e.g. the SAMs, the cruise missiles, the MIG-21s, the KOMAR missile boats, etc.

3. All information on new military equipment arriving in Cuba. (In this connection, we found very useful the three WAVE reports on the unloading of the Sinferopol between 17 and 19 January).

4. Military construction in Cuba and the storage and concealment of military equipment at various locations throughout Cuba.

5. The physical security of Soviet encampments, whether Cubans are being permitted in them, whether there is any change in policy in this regard.

6. Details on the <sup>quantities,</sup> ~~numbers~~, types, and capabilities of Cuban and Soviet weaponry in Cuba.

7. The nature of the guerrilla training programs given in Cuba to nationals of other Latin American countries.

8. All evidence of Cuban subversive activities in other Latin American countries, particularly evidence of Cuban arms shipments and of the participation in and control of subversive operations in other countries by Cubans.

#### IV. WHAT WE DO WITH WAVE CABLES

The Cuba desk in OGI makes extensive use of WAVE cables. It is the only country desk in OGI charged with production of a regular daily publication on developments in and with respect to the country concerned. It therefore publishes ~~much more material~~ much more material on a daily basis. Because of the restricted dissemination of the Daily Summary and because its purpose is primarily to serve the DD/P, a number of WAVE cables which would not--and could not properly--be used in regular OGI publications with wider dissemination are used in the Summary.

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Every morning during the work week (and on weekends during the crisis) [REDACTED] in his absence one of the other two people on the Cuba desk go down to the TFW offices on the first floor to review all the DDP cables that have come in during the past 24 hours. Those selected for use in the Daily Summary are reproduced and brought upstairs. Anything bearing in any way on operational developments <sup>is</sup> ~~not~~ not used or, if <sup>a particular cable</sup> ~~it~~ contains anything possibly bearing on ~~the~~ operational problems but appears as well to contain positive intelligence, its use in the Daily Summary is cleared with the TFW people.

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In this manner WAVE cables are used in intelligence production well in advance of their formal dissemination as TDOS reports. The time between receipt of the raw report and its formal dissemination is usually about 24 hours. On occasions when a particular raw report from WAVE [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is judged to be of special importance and useful in a regular OGI publication, it is possible through contacts in TFW to obtain more rapid dissemination to permit its use in time to meet regular OGI deadlines.